Abstract. Inductive game theory captures how a player inductively derives his/her personal views from experiences. The player may have multiple views, some of which differ from the objective situation, but may revise them with further experiences. This paper gives a logical formulation of this revision process by focusing on the role of player's beliefs. For this objective, we take the AGM approach of belief revision. The idea behind our logic is that the player's belief state is represented by a belief set of propositional formulas, thereby describing a revision process for the belief states by using a revision operation in AGM theory. In this setting, the player's personal views are described as models for the current belief set. We also present an application of our framework to a class of inductive games, called festival games.
Introduction and Overview
Standard game theory assumes players to have sufficient knowledge or common belief of the game they play. However, in a real social or economic situation, such knowledge/belief is not given in advance, but rather emerges from the individual experiences with bounded cognitive abilities and is revised through time. Inductive game theory, originally introduced by Kaneko and Matsui [15] and Kaneko and Kline [12] [13] [14] , explores this issue and captures how a player inductively derives his/her knowledge and beliefs of the game from experiences.
Inductive game theory distinguishes an objective situation and players' personal views of the game. Players are assumed to have little initial knowledge about the objective situation, but repetitively face given situation, to accumulate their experiences through their choices of available actions, and to construct their personal views with the experiences. In the players' construction, they have different personal views based on their different experiences even when the players face an identical situation. Moreover, a player may have multiple views, some differing from the objective situation, but may revise them with further experiences.
The difference in players' views is due not only to their experiences, but also to their memories, which are represented by memory functions. By introducing memory functions, players' abilities of memories can be represented in various ways, although extensive games in standard game theory place some restrictions on the representations. Therefore, even when gathering many experiences, a player may only partially recall his experiences.
While inductive game theory provides a framework to derive a personal view consistent with a player's memories of the experiences, it has been less studied how the derived view is revised by additional experiences. This paper provides a framework for revision in inductive game theory based on the idea of AGM (Alchourrón-Gärdenfors-Makinson) theory of belief revision [1] . By introducing the revision process, we reflect a player's inductive inference in decision-making.
Since standard game theory assumes players to have sufficient knowledge or common belief of the structure, it is not good at treating inductive inferences of the structure. Revision of beliefs in (epistemic) logic has also been applied to standard game theory as in Binmore [2] , Bonnano [4] , van Benthem [17] , Board [3] , and Feinberg [6] [7] 3 . However, such studies usually focus on beliefs about opponent players' actions. While it is important to consider belief formations of opponents' actions in interactive situations, we need to ask whether such beliefs are plausible when the formation heavily depends on (common) knowledge of the structure. Inductive game theory and this paper truly ask the question: How do players cognize the (interactive) situations that they face?
Our logic is based on the standard classical propositional logic. Basic statements in inductive game theory, such as the histories of player's actions and payoffs are associated with propositional atomic formulas, thereby describing causality relations between histories or players' strategies as compound formulas. In terms of this language, the player's belief state is described by a belief set of formulas, thus a revision process for the belief states is described by using a revision operation in AGM theory. In this setting, the player's personal views are described as models for the current belief set (i.e., assignments of truth values which satisfy all the formulas of belief set) in the semantics.
By means of this logic, we also show an application to festival games, which are specific inductive games proposed by Kaneko and Matsui [15] . As explained above, the players in inductive games accumulate their experiences and inductively derive their personal views of the experiences. Festival games capture the mechanisms of prejudices and discriminations resulting from experiences. This paper is organized as follows. The next section gives the definition of inductive game theory following Kaneko and Kline [14] . Section 3 presents our logic for belief revision. Section 4 presents an application of our belief revision to festival games. Finally, Section 5 gives conclusions and discusses further research.
Inductive Game Theory

Information protocols
We define an information protocol Π below. Let W be a nonempty finite set of information pieces, A be a nonempty finite set of actions, and ≺ be a finite subset of 
To describe a player's personal view and an objective situation with information protocols, we require two basic axioms and three non-basic axioms. To stipulate the basic axioms, we define a subsequence of a sequence in Axiom B1 requires that ≺ is closed under a subsequence relation, while axiom B2 states that a sequence ending with a decision piece can be extended to a longer sequence in ≺. When an information protocol satisfies these basic axioms, we call it a basic protocol.
As we shall see in the next subsection, basic protocols are used to describe player's personal views. On the other hand, to describe an objective situation, inductive game theory introduces the concept of full protocol, which is a restricted form of basic protocols. For the detailed definition of full protocols, see [14] .
Players' memories and inductively derived views
The central idea behind inductive game theory is the consideration of a player's memories, from which he/she derives a personal view of the objective situation.
Kaneko and Kline [14] formulated a player's memories in terms of a memory function, which maps each objective history of his/her play to the recollection in the player's mind. We now present a basic framework for an objective world.
Definition 1 (Memory function
)
Definition 2 (Objective situation).
An objective situation is a pair
On the other hand, a player's personal view derived from his/her memories is formulated in terms of the memory function. Let 
Definition 3 (I.d.view). Suppose the objective situation (Π
of a protocol and a memory function for player i is called an inductively derived view from a memory kit T Di iff
In closing this section, to help readers understand the definition of inductive game theory, we present a simple example called the absent-minded driver game [14] .
described by the upper figure in Fig 1 (C) . Now suppose that player 1 plays the game Π o three times and experiences the sequences leading to w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 in this order. After each of the plays, the objective history of his/her behavior is described as the following sequence:
Let us consider the memory functions m R1 describing that player 1 can recall only the latest memory knots within his experiences; that is, m R1 is defined as 
Thus the corresponding sequence of basic experiences is ∆T
0 D1 := φ, ∆T 1 D1 := { w , (w, e), w 1 }, ∆T 2 D1 := ∆T 1 D1 ∪ { (w, c), w , (w, e), w 2 }, ∆T 3 D1 := ∆T 2 D1 ∪ { (w, c
Logical Formulation of Inductive Game Theory
In this section, we first briefly overview the AGM theory of belief revision [1] then presents our logical formulation of inductive game theory. We here introduce a minimal setting which formulates a player's beliefs about experienced sequences. An extension, including the concepts of player's strategy and payoff, shall be considered in the next section.
AGM theory of belief revision
We suppose a propositional language L over a finite alphabet Σ of propositional atomic variables s, t, . . . , s 1 , s 2 , . . . with the usual sentential connectives (¬, ∧, ∨, →, and ↔). Propositional formulas are denoted by ϕ, ψ, . . . , ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , . . ..
As the syntax for L, we suppose the usual inference system of classical propositional logic. Consequence relation is defined by this logic. The set of all logical consequences of a set Γ ⊆ L (i.e., the set {ϕ | Γ ϕ}) is denoted Cn(Γ ). Deductively closed sets of propositional formulas, i.e. K = Cn(K), are denoted K, K , . . . and are called belief sets.
As the semantics for L, we suppose the usual truth assignment and models of propositional logic. A truth assignment is a function σ : Σ → {1, 0}. A truth assignment σ is called a model of a proposition ϕ if σ satisfies ϕ in the classical sense. A model of a set of propositions Γ is a truth assignment σ that satisfies all ϕ ∈ Γ .
The AGM theory of belief revision considers three types of operations on belief sets: expansion+, contraction− and revision . For a belief set K and a formula ϕ, expansion operation is defined as K+ϕ := Cn(K ∪ {ϕ}). Contraction operation is assumed to satisfy the following postulates.
Revision operation can be defined by Levy identity, i.e. K ϕ := (K−¬ϕ)+ϕ (cf. Chapter 1 in [9] ).
Logical formulation
As explained in the previous section, in inductive game theory, a unique objective situation is described by a pair (Π o , m o ) of full protocol and memory functions, while player's accumulated memories are described by basic experiences ∆T Di . Thus, an accumulating process of memories for player i can be represented by a sequence ∆T Our logical formulation of inductive game theory is given along with the following steps. We first fix the propositional language L whose atomic formulas are used to denote statements of the form "a sequence ξ, w may occur". Thus, relations over sequences, such as negation and causality, can be represented by (compound) formulas. We next define a player's belief state as a belief set, which consists of beliefs about experienced sequences and some ex-ante beliefs about causality relations over sequences. For a given sequence ∆T We here fix the objective situation ( 
The language L is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Language).
The propositional language L is defined by considering an alphabet Σ that provides a sufficient number of atomic propositions to denote any sequence in ≺ o . That is, we suppose that there is a bijective mapping
To simplify our discussion, throughout we omit sequences whose length is 1; i.e., sequences of the form w . Next, for ∆T 
is defined by
Intuitively, R1-1 represents the player's initial belief in the impossibility of any elementary sequence. R1-2 and R2-2 represent the persistent belief about causality; i.e., if a sequence may occur then its subsequence also may occur. R2-1 represents the belief that any experienced sequence may occur. For this formulation, the following theorem holds. 
As a corollary of this theorem, any belief set appearing in a sequence K By condition A4 in Definition 6, the following theorem holds. In closing this section, we demonstrate a revision process for player's beliefs in terms of our logic in the case of the absent-minded driver game presented in Example 1. In fact, infinitely many sequences other than those in the list above can be considered, but for simplicity, we here focus attention on sequences whose length is less than 3. Let us consider the situation that player 1 repeatedly plays the game and accumulates experiences. 
For both σ 2 and σ 3 , any value is possible for s 2 and s 7 . This results in multiple i.d.views. For example, in the case that σ 2 (s 2 ) = 1 and σ 2 (s 7 ) = 0, the corresponding i.d.view is the upper figure in Fig 1 (B) , while in the case that σ
Application to Festival Games
In this section, we apply our logic to a specific inductive game, the festival game, which was developed by Kaneko and Matsui [15] and Kaneko and Mitra [16] . The main objective in this section is to formulate the festival games in terms of our logic, thereby showing the revision process of players' beliefs. Especially, we focus attention on the process where players' prejudice is exposed as discriminatory behaviors caused by their experiences. For this objective, we first introduce the definition of festival games following [15] and then present the formulation of festival games in terms of our logic.
Festival games
The festival game considers that each of the players belongs to an ethnic group, and the player's festival location is chosen. Each player then decides his attitude, friendly or unfriendly, after observing ethnic groups at his location. Using this framework, Kaneko and Matsui [15] studied how prejudices, as a fallacious image of ethnic groups, arise from players' experiences and how discrimination arises as an unfriendly attitude.
Let us define the objective situation ( In the second stage, player i's position is given as Let S i be the set of strategies for player i. For a strategy profile st ∈ S 1 × · · · × S n , the player's payoff is determined by his/her attitude and the mood of the location he chose. The mood of festival f k with f k = l i for player i (denoted µ i ) is given by the number of friendly people at l i other than player i; that is, . . . , r n ), and frd and unfrd are interpreted as 1 and 0, respectively. We then define the payoff function of player i as
Logical formulation of festival games
To give a logical formulation of the above example, we here extend our logic introduced in the previous section to capture the concepts of strategies and payoffs. We first introduce the language as follows: Definition 7 (Language for festival games). The language L is defined by fixing the alphabet Σ to denote:
-occurrence of any sequence in ≺ o , -statements of the form "player i chooses f j as his festival location," denoted l i = f j , -statements of the form "the ethnicity configuration at festival f j is E j " (denoted E j ), -statements of the form "player i chooses frd (unfrd) as his attitude in the festival he chose," denoted a i = frd (a i = unfrd, respectively),
-statements of the form "player i's payoff is x", denoted payoff i = x.
For readability, we introduce equational expressions instead of single characters to denote these propositional atoms.
In terms of this language, we next give the definition of the sequence of player i's belief sets, K
. .. The idea behind our definition is as follows. In addition to Definition 5, we also consider the player's belief about his/her current strategy, experienced ethnicity configurations. Strategy st i = (l i , r i ) with l i = f k , r i (l i , E j ) = frd/unfrd is described as the set of formulas
where the expression {frd, unfrd} denotes one of frd and unfrd. The latest decisions of location and attitude, as well as the resulting payoff, are uniquely determined in the current belief set. 
Definition 8 (Belief sets in festival games). Suppose that ∆T
Θ is obtained by the following rules R2-1 (2)-(4):
where w
Intuitively, R1-1 and R2-1 revise the beliefs about experienced sequences, while R1-2 and R2-2 mean the beliefs about causality. These are essentially the same as Definition 5, but R1-2 is extended to maintain the uniqueness of choices of locations, attitude, the resulting payoff, and ethncity configurations. R1-3 and R2-3 revise the current strategy. Finally, R1-4 and R2-4 revise the player's strategy if there is another strategy which improves the latest payoff.
We here note that for all the operations in the above definition except for the belief revision for experienced sequences, every removed formula is identical to the negation of corresponding added formula. Thus, if we consider the subtraction (\) and the addition (∪) to be− and+, respectively, these operations clearly satisfy postulates P1-P8 and the condition that
Therefore, by this fact and Theorem 1, we can prove the following theorem. Moreover, by our construction of the initial belief set, K 0 i , and by this theorem, every belief set appearing in the sequence is guaranteed to be consistent.
We finally define assignment functions that are obtained from given basic experiences and a player's strategy. Intuitively, A6 means that player i chooses f j as his/her location. A7 represents the location configuration. A8 means that player i chooses frd (or unfrd) as the attitude. For this semantics, the following theorem still holds. This paper provided a dynamic framework to revise players' personal views of their experiences following inductive game theory. In addition, we applied our framework to festival games to explain how prejudices and discrimination emerge. In a subsequent paper, we will investigate festival games within our framework.
Definition 9 (Assignment functions). For each ∆T
A6 σ(l
We finally comment on our findings. First, our inductive derivation differs from learning theory approaches in the literature such as those of Fudenberg and Levine [8] . Standard learning theories do not focus on the learning of structure, but on the learning of beliefs of opponents' actions. Second, while making use of the framework of inductive game theory developed by Kaneko and Kline and Kaneko and Matsui, our theory focuses on a permanent revision process based on the player's experiences. While the developers of inductive game theory focused on how to construct a player's view consistent with his experiences, we focused on how to change a playerfs personal view when he has a new experience.
Finally, the treatment of experiences in our theory slightly differs from the standard belief revision theory pioneered by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson [1] (so-called AGM theory). In contrast to AGM theory, our theory distinguishes between what a player originally believes and what he logically derives from the original belief. This is based on our motivation that the players are not simply a database, but have some logical abilities. This approach is similar to the belief base theory, which distinguishes between the belief base and the consequence. 5 However, the theory of the belief base focuses neither on the new observations as the experiences in our theory nor on their accumulation. Our theory combines the use of accumulated observations and beliefs logically derived from them for decision-making.
In further research, we will investigate (i) how players with different views make decisions in our theory and (ii) the direction of various players' views after repetitive revision. In standard game theory, players face an identical situation and know that even when considering incomplete information games. Our theory is a first step to inquiring whether it is possible to achieve and to analyze misunderstandings pointed out by Kaneko [11] . In a society in which people do not necessarily recognize identical environments, we wonder how people harmonize with each other. This question will drive future research.
